Concurrent to the activity on the AF-12, a
bomber version of the A-12, referred to as the
RB-12, also was being studied. A forward
fuselage full-scale mock-up had been completed
and on July 5, along with the AF-12 mockup,
was reviewed by Generals Curtis LeMay
and Thomas Power. The two found the mockups
of considerable interest and asked if either
configuration could be modified to carry a terminal
radar or an air-to-ground missile.
Johnson responded favorably, by stating, "we
could do this within the aerodynamic configuration
of the A-12 and, for the job that they outlined
to do, which was to place a missile within
200 feet of a target, one could not argue about
the use of a guided missile rather than our simpler
approach in the RB-12 report." The latter
referred to the use of conventional free-falling
bombs.
The RB-12 study had in fact resulted from
the recent development of small, high-yield
nuclear warheads. Johnson, in an RB-12 proposal,
had noted that the aircraft could result in
a "very powerful striking force...with little or no
weight or space penalty..." to the aircraft. Four
hypothetical 400 pound bombs based on the
new warheads, or a single Polaris-sized warhead
could be accommodated in a fuselage
bomb bay while retaining the same fuel load as
the reconnaissance A-12. No aerodynamic
changes were required and the radar attenuating
features of the aircraft could be retained.
The latter, coupled with the aircraft's extraordinary performance, almost certainly would make
chances of detection close to non-existent.
In addition to these queries, it was noted
by Johnson that, "While Hughes was giving a
presentation on a simplified air-to-ground
weapon system, LeMay took me by the arm
and we went to another office. He told me that
he wasn't very sure that the RB-12 would
become a model, but he felt sure 'we would get
some fighters'. I asked him, 'what about reconnaissance
airplanes like the A-12?' and he seemed surprised that the Air Force were not
getting any. He made a note on a yellow paper
and asked me how soon we would have to
know about A-12s to continue our production. I
told him within two to three months."
In fact, the RB-12 program would not
reach the hardware stage. This was not as a
result of lack of capability, but rather because it
was a threat to the on-going North American
XB-70A Valkyrie...a program with considerable
political clout and one on which the Air Force
had hung its hat for a Boeing B-52 replacement.
Surprisingly, as noted on October 26,
1961, Johnson discovered the Department of
Defense found the RB-12 more interesting than
the AF-12. He noted, however, "The Air Force,
from LeMay down, do want the AF-12."